LAND
REFORM POLICIES
The South African land reform policies of
the first non-racial democratic government begin with the Constitution,
the Rural Development Programme (RDP) and a process of consultation
involving community level research and advice from international
experts, the most influential being from the World Bank.
The
RDP, which was essentially the election manifesto of the African
National Congress (ANC) in 1994, had five key programmes:
meeting basic needs; developing our human resources;
building the economy; democratising the state and society,
and implementing the RDP.[13] Land reform is largely
dealt with under the programme of meeting basic needs and
also referred to under building the economy. The RDP makes
clear an intention to have a process of restitution for those
dispossessed of land by racial laws and a redistribution of
land to those who need it. A specific target of redistributing
30% of agricultural land within five years was set. The RDP
suggests a range of measures for redistributing land including
a land tax to free up land, substantial funding,
expropriation of land, and support services to ensure effective
land use. It is important to note that the RDP was completed
after the interim constitution was written and put its plans
for land reform within the confines of the provisions on land
contained within the constitution. Not surprisingly, the RDP
did not go far beyond listing a lot of good intentions and
wishes. It did not address difficult issues of how to avoid
or deal with the consequences of disrupting existing commercial
agriculture or the resistance to fundamental change that was
bound to come from landowners and from international business
interests. The intentions set out in the RDP would, had they
been decisively acted on, have gone someway to bringing about
a fundamental transformation of property relations. The test
of the RDP came at the point when it had to be made into implementable
policies and laws with budgets attached. The main weakness
lay in the compromises contained in the section on building
the economy that fell short of mapping out a path of radical
economic restructuring. The few intimations in the RDP of
anything outside a narrow free-market ideology, such as statements
like increasing the public sector in strategic areas
through, for example, nationalisation, were soon vanquished
from future economic policies and statements. The clause already
revealed an uncertainty as it fell short of saying that there
would be widespread nationalisation as part of building a
strong state capable of driving economic transformation. Nationalisation,
became a for example and is quickly followed by
talk of purchasing shares in companies and joint ventures
with the private sector. Talk of democratising the economy
and involving workers in decisions about the economy have
in practice never gone beyond rhetoric.
The
constitution of South Africa[14] was a result of and a key
part of the negotiated settlement that ended Apartheid. Section
25 that deals with land rights was hotly debated. The resulting
compromise set the political direction for the handling of
land reform and set the legal parameters within which land
reform has to be dealt with. The basic land to the tiller
sentiment of the freedom charter that called for land to belong
to those who work it was not given expression in the constitution.
The sentiment, expressed in the preamble, that South
Africa belongs to all who live in it, finds no place
in the property clause. The constitution recognises existing
property rights in sections 25(1) and in section 25(2) allows
for expropriation only for a public purpose or in the
public interest and with compensation being paid. Section
25(4) goes on to say; the public interest includes the
nations commitment to land reform. The constitution
not only allows for expropriation, but makes specific mention
that land reform is a grounds for expropriation. The compensation
to be paid does not have to be at market rates, there are
four other factors that have to be considered including the
purpose of the expropriation. Section 25(8) says that
no provision of this section may impede the state from
taking legislative and other measures to achieve land, water
and related reform, in order to redress the results of past
racial discrimination. Sub-sections 25(5), (6), and
(7) require the state to take legislative measures to; ensure
that there is equitable access to land, people with insecure
tenure get secure tenure or equitable redress, and people
dispossessed of land rights due to racially discriminatory
laws or practices can claim back those rights. These sections
oblige the state to deal with aspects of land reform while
also recognising current property rights. Thus the constitution
is a constraint to the changing property relations in as far
as it protects existing property rights, requires compensation
to be paid for land to be used for land reform and does not
establish clear rights to property for all South Africans
or even for those who work the land. On the other hand the
constitution does create an obligation on the state to have
land reform and leaves space for far reaching reforms if the
state is willing and able to make available sufficient finances
and to implement a programme that can make the most of the
land reform possibilities within the constraints.
The
1997 White Paper on South African Land Policy sets for itself
a wide range of objectives ranging from dealing with the injustices
of racially based land dispossession, to promoting economic
growth and providing secure tenure for all. The
white paper also states that the vision is of a land
policy and land reform programme that contributes to reconciliation,
stability, growth and development in an equitable and sustainable
way. The White paper does not offer a vision of a transformed
rural society nor does it set clear targets for land redistribution.
What it offers is a process, involving compromises for the
sake of reconciliation, which it is hard to imagine dealing
effectively with the massive apartheid created disparities
in land access and economic power.
There is an emphasis in the document on giving land rights
and opportunities to the poor and addressing gender issues
in land ownership. But the impact of these intentions will
be limited by the lack of fundamental reform of land ownership.
In the implementation plans the White paper continues to compromise
and fails to provide decisive programmes for fundamental change.
It sets a limited role for the state and makes it clear that
redistributive land reform will be largely based on
willing-buyer willing seller arrangements. Limiting
the role of the state further it is said that the government
will in general not be the buyer or owner. Rather it
will make land acquisition grants available. Apart from
the case of Labour Tenants there is no clear intention to
give rights to land to those who live and work on it such
as other farm dwellers. Instead they are offered access to
grants for off farm settlements and on farm settlements where
the owners of the land agree. This does not address at all
the difficulty of accessing suitable land in the face of the
intransigence of farm owners despite the fact that farm dwellers
have often lived on the land for generations.
Where
the white paper completely falls down is in failing to link
land reform to any broader transformation of the economy.
The failure to ever mention the concept of agrarian reform
appears to be no accident as the policies steer clear of any
restructuring of rural economic and political power relations
that would need to be part of any agrarian reform programme.
The agrarian reform that has gone on over the last decade
in South Africa has involved the dramatic liberalisation of
the agricultural sector and the engagement in international
trade deals. These have happened with no reference to the
land reform programme. Land reform policy has, in failing
to set land reform as a central part of economic transformation
accepted the current dominant economic system and therefore
limited change in property rights to changes in land ownership
that will not disrupt the economic order, but will if possible
re-enforce it.
The
budgetary commitments of the government are a practical expression
of its policy priorities. In the case of land reform the budgets
are the clearest indication of the lack of commitment to making
land reform work and show that there is no intention of meeting
even the limited promises made in policy pronouncements. In
order to achieve a redistribution of only 30% of agricultural
land over 15 years the government will be required to spend
approximately R1.67billion Rand per year for fifteen years.[15]
Unfortunately the government has only budgeted around R500million
per year for the next three years for both redistribution
and restitution (which does not always get used for land purchases).
Over the last years even less than this has actually been
spent on land for land reform. It has been argued that the
budget is low due to the inability of the Department to spend
the money. However, if there were a commitment to implementation
the response to such capacity constraint would surely be to
deal with capacity problems, including the personnel and programme
management budgets, rather than cutting the budgets for these
as is being done[16].
|